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Abstract 
This study uses a longitudinal data source to study the effects of conflict-induced displacement on 
labour market outcomes for Bosnians in post-war Bosnia and Herzegovina. To account for 
endogeneity in the displacement status, I exploit the fact that the level of violence in the pre-war 
residence likely affected the displacement decision for Bosnians and yet is not associated to economic 
performance. I find evidence of positive selection into displacement, i.e. more "able" individuals in 
terms of labour market outcomes are more likely to be displaced, and that displaced Bosnians men 
and women are less likely to be in work relative to stayers. Interestingly, whereas this translates into 
higher unemployment for men, it decreases women's participation with no effect on unemployment 
once selection is accounted for. The informality of the labour market in BiH and the destruction of 
networks are not only the most plausible candidates to explain the high cost of displacement in terms 
of labour market outcomes, but they also help rationalise the lack of an effect on participation for 
displaced men. However, differences in selection suggest that the experience of war was highly 
contrasted along gender lines and that sociological and cultural factors may also play a significant 
role. 
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1 Introduction
One direct consequence of armed conflicts is population displacement. Those parts of the population
who are uprooted from their original place of residence are likely to experience particularly stark socio-
economic vulnerability during and after the period of conflict (CIET International, 1997). The unique
characteristics of the 1992/95 Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) conflict and the devastating consequences on
the Bosnians1 in particular present an analytical opportunity with both academic and policy relevance.
First, the path of the war was determined by the non-economic desire of the Serbs to spatially separate
the ethnic groups. Second, the Bosnian civilian population suﬀered the brunt of the war as 64,036 of
the casualties were Bosnian (or about 3 percent of the pre-war Bosnian population) of whom only 52
percent were soldiers, compared to 24,905 for the Serbs of whom 84 percent were soldiers (Ball et al.,
2007). Finally, displacement was widespread —approximately 1.3 million people were displaced during
the conflict and 1 million resettled in BiH after the conflict.
This study documents the nature of selection into displacement and the labour market eﬀects of conflict
displacement in the context of the 1992/95 BiH war. I use longitudinal post-conflict household survey
data containing rich information on labour market outcomes, migration and status and other individual
characteristics to estimate the eﬀect of displacement on a number of labour market outcomes of the
displaced Bosnians relative to their stayer counterparts.2 I account for potential endogeneity between
displacement and individual labour market outcomes by using a method of instrumental variable (IV)
estimation.
The results of this study contribute to two strands of literature: individual selection into conflict-
induced migration and the cost of conflict at the microeconomic level. While individual selection into
economic migration is well researched3, the literature oﬀers no empirical evidence on the nature of the
selection into conflict displacement, most likely due to the scarcity of adequate sources of identification.4
This study contributes to filling this gap by documenting the nature of the selection into displacement
in a context of civil conflict.
A growing number of studies have emerged that oﬀer a measure of the cost of conflict at the microeco-
1By Bosnians, I refer to muslim Bosnians, as opposed to Serb and Croat Bosnians to whom I refer to as Serbs and Croats
respectively.
2This study therefore does not assess the extent of ethnic discrimination in BiH nor is it concerned with the process
of cultural assimilation by any of the main ethnic groups represented on the territory. For a contribution on the topic of
cultural assimilation of foreign immigrants and language in the US context, see Lazear (1999).
3For instance, Chiswick (1999) outlines why we should expect economic migrants to be positively selected. Borjas (1987)
documents that immigrants to the US can be negatively selected when the earning distribution is more unequal in the home
country than in the host country. De Coulon and Piracha (2005) show that Albanian immigrants returning to Albania are
negatively selected relative to the stayers.
4 Interestingly, however, Chiswick (1999) notes that (positive) selection is likely to be less prominent in the case of
non-economic migrants such as "refugees".
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nomic level.5 For instance, Blattman (2006) and Shemyakina (2006) find that civil conflicts in Uganda
and Tajikistan significantly reduced school attendance and grade completion.6 Kondylis (2007a) assesses
the cost of conflict at the household level with regard to agricultural productivity following the conflicts
in Rwanda. In addition, a number of microeconomic studies suggest a causal link between poverty, the
lack of economic prospects in particular, and the likelihood of joining a militia (Deininger, 2003; Bigombe
et al., 2000; Verwimp, 2005). By providing an analysis of post-conflict economic performance, this study
also contributes to this strand of literature on conflict prevention.
This is the first study to analyze the nature of selection into displacement during a conflict and to assess
the eﬀect of conflict-induced displacement on the labour market outcomes of the displaced. The eﬀect
of displacement is measured on a number of individual labour market outcomes, including indicators
of work, unemployment, inactivity, wages and hours worked, controlling for individual characteristics,
displacement status and municipality of destination fixed eﬀects.7 Exploiting the longitudinal nature of
the data, I control for individual unobserved heterogeneity by including an individual random-eﬀect error
component in my regression models. The labour market outcomes of the displaced are compared to those
of stayers. Displacement status is defined using the date of the last migration: a person who reports
having migrated during the period of the conflict or soon after —while resettlement and returns were still
occurring on a large scale— is considered a displaced person. Since a displaced person’s decision to resettle
in her municipality of origin as opposed to moving to a new municipality of destination constitutes an
outcome variable, the eﬀect of displacement measured in this study is averaged over those who returned
to their municipality of origin and those who did not.
Typically, displacement as such is contaminated by problems of self-selection that could potentially
lead to endogeneity issues when used as a regressor on individual labour market outcomes. Therefore,
using an OLS or GLS with random-eﬀect error component regression framework to estimate the eﬀect
of displacement would likely produce inconsistent estimates. To account for this potential source of
endogeneity, I exploit spatial variations in the level of violence against Bosnians during the 1992/95 war
to provide IV estimates of the cost of displacement on labour market outcomes.
As local violence is likely to serve as a good predictor for the displacement of Bosnians, it can be
5A large body of literature also establishes the link between civil conflicts and a country’s socioeconomic performance
at a macroeconomic level using cross-country comparisons. Miguel et al. (2004) find a positive causal relation between
economic under-performance and the likelihood of civil strife in Africa. Collier (2003) finds supportive evidence of a ‘conflict
trap’, whereby low aggregate levels of physical as well as human capital correlate to the likelihood of conflict resurgence.
6Blattman’s (2006) study uses arguably random abduction of children by the militia to measure the long-term costs
of child soldiering for boys in Northern Uganda. Shemyakina (2006) finds significant and negative eﬀects on girls though,
interestingly, her results suggest no eﬀect for boys.
7Municipalities are the fourth and last level of political division, below entities, districts, and cantons. There were 115
muncipalities in 1991 BiH, and some were divided after the war to form 137 municipalities. In 1991, the median population
in the municipalities was 31577, and the mean was 44439, with a maximum of 195,139 and a minimum of 4,162.
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used as an instrumental variable to purge the estimates of the impact of displacement on labour market
outcomes of potential inconsistency and shed some light on the selection process. The pattern of the Serb
invasions in the 1992/95 BiH war was not governed by an economic purpose but by the will to create
an ethnically homogenous and contiguous Serb territory (UN, 1994; UNHCR, 1998; Burg and Shoup,
1999; Nation, 2003; Toal and Dahlman, 2004). There is, therefore, no reason a priori to expect pre-war
economic performance and the levels of violence endured in a given municipality to be systematically
associated. A particularly attractive feature of the data used is that the municipality of residence before
the war, or "municipality of origin", is recorded for all adults. Individuals can, therefore, be matched
to their municipality of origin and can be assigned the level of violence in their location of origin, using
population loss data also available at the municipality level (RDCS, 2007). This allows me to exploit
variations in the level of violence across municipalities of origin for identification. Since the assumption
of zero correlation between economic performance and the level of violence at a local level is central to
this analysis, I perform a number of robustness and falsification exercises to assess its accuracy given the
data at hand. All results corroborate the notion that this is a reasonable assumption.
An advantage of including both those who returned to their municipality of origin and those who
moved to a new municipality of destination in the sample of displaced is that I can include municipality
of destination fixed eﬀects in the model even when IV is used. Non-random sorting of individuals into
their municipality of origin poses a potential threat to the consistency of the regression estimates. If
the choice of municipality of destination is correlated with unobserved determinants of individual labour
market performance, this might lead to biased estimates of the eﬀect of displacement on labour market
outcomes. Hence, in the absence of a credible instrument for the assignment of individuals to various
municipalities of destination, conditioning on municipality of destination fixed-eﬀects will capture the
potential non-random location of individuals within BiH.
My results consistently corroborate the idea that displacement negatively impacted the labour market
outcomes of Bosnian men and women particularly in terms of access to employment. Interestingly, the
eﬀect of lower employment on participation in the labour market varies across genders: whereas for men
it entirely translates into higher unemployment, it implies lower participation for women once selection is
accounted for. The results obtained when displacement is instrumented substantially exceed the one-step
estimates, implying that Bosnian men and women positively selected into displacement, i.e. that the more
"able" were more likely to migrate. While the results suggest some significant patterns of assimilation
of displaced women into the labour market over time, they also suggest that it is a slow process and
that displaced women do not "catch-up" with their stayer counterparts. In all gender groups, I find
no additional eﬀect of education on labour market outcomes for the displaced. I further run a number
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of robustness checks and find that my results cannot be attributed to disruption in schooling or to
displacement along the new 1995 border. The informality of the labour market in BiH and the destruction
of networks are not only the most plausible candidates to explain the high cost of displacement in terms of
labour market outcomes, but they also help rationalise the lack of an eﬀect on participation for displaced
men. However, diﬀerences in selection suggest that the experience of war was highly contrasted along
gender lines and that sociological and cultural factors may also play a significant role.
The next subsection introduces some background on the war and the post-war reconstruction in BiH.
In the second section I present the data and some descriptive evidence on the main variables of interest.
The empirical strategy is detailed in the third section. The econometric results are presented in the
fourth section and discussed in the fifth section. A sixth section briefly concludes.
1.1 Background on Bosnia and Herzegovina
BiH is a former territory of ex-Yugoslavia that became independent with the fall of the communist
regime in 1992. The population of BiH in 1992 was 4.4 million people and was composed of 40 percent
Bosnians, 37 percent Serbs, and 17 percent Croats. Most Bosnians are Muslim, whereas the Serbs are
essentially Orthodox Christian and the Croats Catholic. Although I do not, to this date, have access to
comprehensive pre-conflict socioeconomic household data, there is no evidence that pre-1992 economic
prosperity diﬀered systematically across ethnic lines.
Shortly after independence in 1992 a war broke out among the Serbs, the Bosnians and the Croats. The
Bosnian-Croat war lasted from 1993 to 1994. The Bosnian-Serb and Croat-Serb conflicts lasted longer,
but in 1994, NATO used its air force to bomb Serb strongholds and, in December 1995, the Dayton Peace
Agreement ended four years of ethnic conflict in BiH. The agreement initiated the partitioning of the
territory into 2 distinct entities: the Bosnian and Croat-led Federation of Bosnia Herzegovina (FBH) and
the Serb-led Republika Srpska (RS). Each entity makes up for roughly a half of the total territory with
the new borders established on the 1995 front lines (Burg and Shoup, 1999; Toal and Dahlman, 2004).
The conflict and partitioning created widespread displacement. Reports by the International Criminal
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) estimate that 102,000 people were declared missing or dead8,
and the UNHCR reports that 1.3 million people were displaced either internally or abroad. Between
1996 and 2004, over 1 million of the displaced ‘resettled’ in BiH with two peaks in 1996 and 2001.9 The
8Most estimates did not previously take into account possible overlapping of the casualties data and had a tendency
to overestimate the number of deaths. The municipality level population losses data used in this study is in line with the
ICTY estimate.
9As documented by Angrist and Kugler (2003), the Balkan wars resulted in an important wave of immigration to western
Europe. This is of concern, as the displaced who resettled in BiH might consist of a selected sample. As a check, I compare
the education attainment of the displaced in our sample to that reported by Angrist and Kugler. I find that 31 percent of
our sample of men is in the equivalent of their low education group (ISCED levels 0-2) against 39 in their sample. Therefore,
if anything, our sample of displaced is positively selected, which implies that my results are conservative estimates of the
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displaced were free to resettle anywhere in the territory; however, most displaced Bosnians were found
to resettle in the FBH and most Serbs chose the RS.10
Although the conflict caused massive infrastructure destruction, large amounts of aid were put into the
reconstruction eﬀort. Of the 1,295,000 housing units in the country (of which 80% were privately owned
houses), 500,000 were subject to destruction either partial or total (UNHCR). The amount of damage and
destruction as a fraction of the total stock of housing units by entity is as follows: 50% damaged and 6%
of destroyed in the FBH against 24% damaged and 5% destroyed in the RS. In order to help the country
rebuild and cope with the displaced returnees crisis, the Priority Reconstruction Program was put into
place in 1995/99 by the UNHCR, the World Bank, and the European Union. The programme mainly
aimed to provide help and/or materials to re-habilitate housing units. There was no individual selection
into the programme and availability was the only criterion to determine the allocation of material and
aid. The UN found an occupancy rate of re-built houses of about 77 percent overall, including those who
returned to abandoned re-built houses and not their own. It promoted the rebuilding of approximately
10-15 percent of houses per aﬀected village in order to encourage non-programme households to return
or relocate in areas which suﬀered badly from destruction, hence attenuating population density in
relatively less blighted areas. The average expenditure on re-habilitating a house was between US$1,000
and US$3,000 according to the extent of the damage. An estimate of the total cost of damage to houses
is put at US$ 4 billion (UNHCR), and the Priority Reconstruction Program channelled about US$ 693
million toward re-construction. This programme likely created some transitory job-rich economic growth.
However, as its intensity decreased over time and stopped in 1999, well before the first wave of the panel
was collected, this should not aﬀect the estimates of the impact of displacement on time use.11
2 Data
This study exploits detailed longitudinal household survey data, the 2001/04 Living in BiH (LBiH) panel,
as well as municipality-level data on war casualties published by the Research and Documentation Centre
in Sarajevo (RDCS, 2007). The 1991 BiH population census is also used to document the total pre-war
cost of conflict.
10As the displaced were not forced back into their pre-war residence, the issue arises of whether the decision to return to
their original residence or not consists of an outcome variable per se. In 1999 the Commission for Real Property Claims of
Displaced Persons and Refugees of the UNHCR carried out a survey of the return intentions among displaced persons and
refugees still internally displaced and asked those willing to return to their homes (76 percent in the FBH and 34 percent
in the RS) their main reason for wanting to return to their pre-war residence. The main self-reported reason was that
"this was their home" (59 percent), whereas the second most quoted factor was that "their current housing situation was
unacceptable" (proportion not reported). I further discuss the implications this has on this study’s empirical methodology
later as I describe the empirical framework.
11All figures given above on the destruction during the war and the extent of the reconstruction programme were issued
by the UNHCR (1998). For a thorough description of the pattern of returns to pre-war residence in post-war BiH, see Toal
and Dahlman (2004).
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population at the municipality level.
The 2001/04 LBiH panel randomly sampled households in BiH and recorded information on demo-
graphics, labour activities, migration, education, and other characteristics on all individuals aged 15 and
above in the selected households. The sampling scheme of the panel was stratified as follows. First, the
137 municipalities of BiH were split into 6 strata (using a created Master Sample): by entity, and type
(rural, urban, and "mixed"). Municipalities were independently sampled from each of the 6 strata. 25
municipalities were then selected with probability proportional to their estimated population size within
each stratum (11 in the RS, 14 in the FBH).12 From these municipalities, 5400 households were inter-
viewed between September and November in 2001, and half were then re-interviewed each year from 2002
to 2004 to form a panel (in this study the sample used is only composed of those households followed into
the panel). In the end, the panel samples about 4800 individuals from all ethnic backgrounds, between 70
to 442 individuals in each municipality, aged 18-64 in each wave. A unique identifier allows us to follow
individuals from the cross-section to the panel. The attrition across the waves of the panel is modest, on
the order of 4% per wave, as households were followed when they moved geographically.13 The panel is
unbalanced, with individuals moving in and out of households, and households and individuals changing
municipality across waves. This has implications on the computation of the standard errors, as clustering
cannot be used at the household nor at the municipality-level. Robust standard errors are reported in
all subsequent regressions. It is also worth noting that, since ethnicity was only ascertained from 2002
onward, I drop those individuals who only appear in 2001.
The RDCS population losses data (which is in line with the ICTY total estimate of the casualties)
and the 1991 census are used to build the proportion of the pre-war population that went missing in each
municipality as a result of the conflict. The number of casualties are recorded by municipality of suﬀering
as opposed to municipality of origin. This oﬀers a measure of the severity of the conflict at the local
level, which is used to provide an exclusion restriction in subsequent instrumental variable estimation.14
2.1 A Measure of Displacement
The UNHCR estimates that the 1997 to 2001 period saw large numbers of displaced people (internally
displaced and refugees alike) resettling in the territory of BiH. Figure 2 illustrates the patterns of mi-
12The population of a municipality is subject to large variations across municipalities: it ranges from approximately 5000
to 200,000 individuals. The municipalities included in the sample are the following: Visoko, Gradacˇac, Kakanj, Zavidovi´ci,
Vogoš´ca, Breza, Posušje, Grude, Novi Grad, Modricˇa, Srbac, Šamac, Višegrad, Srpska Ilidzˇa, Knezˇevo, Cˇajnicˇe, Travnik,
Novi Grad, Tuzla, Novo Sarajevo, Prijedor, Banja Luka, Zvornik, Centar, and Zenica. A map of BiH is presented in Figure
1.
13As individuals are followed when they change residence across waves of the panel, the number of sampled municipalities
increases from the original 25 in the 2001 LSMS to 44 in 2004 (21 in the RS and 33 in the FBH).
14Although the census also contains pre-war information on ethnicity at the municipality level, ethnicity of the victims is
considered too sensitive for public release and is not available in the population losses data.
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grations for Bosnians by year of arrival in the municipality of destination as recorded in the 2001/04
LBiH panel. It is clear that migrations intensified in 1992-2001. I define individual displacement status
using information on the last migration recorded at the individual level for all individuals aged 15 and
above in the LBiH panel data. The year the individual left her municipality of origin is not observed
in the data; however, the date the individual moved in her current residence ("year moved into current
place of residence") is recorded and I use it to define whether the migration occurred in the context of
the 1992-95 war. Consistent with the evidence shown above, all resettlements that occurred between
1992 and 2001 are categorized as conflict-induced displacement. Robustness checks on the definition of
war-related displacement by narrowing the definition down to the 1992-96 period indicate that parameter
constancy cannot be rejected across definitions (Kondylis, 2007b).
A remarkable feature of the LBiH panel is that the municipality of residence before the war (or
municipality of origin) is recorded for all individuals, whether they report having migrated or not. This
allows me to attribute the level of local violence experienced in the pre-war municipality of residence
(municipality of origin) to each individual regardless of her displacement status, using the casualties data
from the RDCS as a proxy for local violence.15
There are three main limitations in measuring the eﬀect of displacement using the LBiH. First,
‘refugees’ (displaced persons who went into exile abroad during the time of the conflict) and ‘internally
displaced’ (persons who resettled in camps within BiH during the conflict) cannot be separately identified.
No information is held on the place of residence in the period between the time a displaced person left her
municipality of origin and the time she resettled in her municipality of destination. Hence ‘displaced’ as
used in this study includes both refugees and internally displaced. Second, the definition of displacement
only includes those who declared that they were living in BiH just before the war.16 Finally, only the
date of the last resettlement is recorded. Consequently, the duration of the initial displacement is not
observed in the data and I cannot use the period spent in camps as a source of variation in the treatment.
The definition of displacement used in this study does not take into account the individual decision
to return to the municipality of origin or to resettle in a new municipality of destination. Indeed, the
decision to return or not to the same municipality constitutes an outcome variable in itself. Therefore,
consistent estimates of the eﬀect of displacement cannot be obtained on the selected sample of those
displaced who returned to the municipality of origin. This study compares displaced persons’ labour
market outcomes to stayers’ averaging across the displaced who moved to a new municipality and those
15Although I do not condition the displacement status on self-reported outcomes, I further test the relevance of the
definition of displacement using self-reported individual information from the panel: the main reason for the last migration
and the individual "status" in her current residence. More details on those checks are provided in the data appendix.
16Only 66 people (1% of our total sample) declared living abroad when the war started. Those individuals are likely to
be quite diﬀerent to those living in BiH before the war and are not included in the treatment group.
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who returned to their municipality of origin. The implications this has on the identification is further
discussed below as I present the empirical strategy.
2.2 Descriptive Evidence
2001 BiH was populated by about 3.9 million people, 48.3% Bosnian, 34% Serb, 15.4% Croat, and 2.3%
from other ethnic backgrounds. The gross national income was very low, about US$1,290 per capita.17
The economy is highly informal. The World Bank estimates that the share of informal employment was
about 37% in 2001 and 42% in 2004 (respectively 33 and 36 percent in the FBH and 41 and 49 in the
RS). 40% of those working in the informal sector are employed in agriculture, 19% in construction, 9%
in manufacturing and 9% in trade (Bank, 2005a). The public sector represents a large share of total
employment, but this share is decreasing over time (from 52% in 2001 to 42% in 2004) due to a rate of
job creation lower than the rate of retirement and to a tentative privatization of state-owned enterprises.
Although employment in the private sector has been on the rise between 2001 and 2004 (from 34 to 40%),
the Bank concludes that most of the job creation over the 2001-2004 period originated from the informal
sector. The high level of informality on the labour market in BiH is likely to impact on the labour market
outcomes of the displaced upon their resettlement within BiH. However, the only measure of informality
one could extract from the LBiH data would only be partial.18 Furthermore this study’s focus is to look
on the diﬀerentials in labour market outcomes as a whole between the population of stayers and that of
the displaced.
Tables 3 and 4 describe labour market status by gender, age group, ethnicity and region as reported in
the LBiH panel. In both tables, the reported sample means are averaged over all four waves of the panel.
The analysis is restricted to men and women aged 18-64. Labour market outcomes for men by entity is
reported in the lower part of Table 3. Bosnian men in the RS experience a higher unemployment rate
than the average level in the FBH (48.0% against 19.2%), but a similar level of participation (inactivity
rates are 17.2% in the RS against 19.2% in the FBH). The descriptive analysis of labour market status
by entity for women provide similar results as for men. Regional stigmatisation of the ethnic minority is
likely to account for higher worklessness in the RS.
Looking at disparities in labour market outcomes across displaced and stayers using simple descriptive
analysis gives us a sense of the labour market cost of displacement (lower panels, Tables 3 and 4). Bosnian
men’s time use by displacement status (Table 3) displays significant disparities in employment rates of
17World Development Indicators, World Bank (2000).
18 Indeed, the labour part of the individual questionnaire does not allow for an evaluation of the informality of the work
occupied. The only information record of informality surveyed was the "non-agricultural owned businesses" part of the
cross-sectional 2001 LSMS and only refers to those households who actually own a business. In addition, the informality of
the non-owner employees is not available.
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about 14 percentage points. Nevertheless, this does not translate into higher inactivity but into higher
unemployment for the displaced relative to the stayers. Although observed and unobserved characteristics
need to be controlled for to procure robustness to these estimates, it seems that, on average, displaced
Bosnian men’s access to work is notably worse than that of stayers, despite a higher level of labour
market participation. As shown in Table 4, displaced Bosnians are less likely to be in work by about 7
percentage points and more likely, by a similar amount, to be in unemployment relative to their stayer
counterparts. Overall, this descriptive exercise suggests that, although displacement has a large negative
eﬀect on employment rate for both men and women, it does not lead to significant disparity in labour
market participation.
Finally, Table 5 reports descriptive statistics of educational attainment by gender, age, and displace-
ment status. Diﬀerences in education across displacement status are mostly insignificant and, where
significant, small suggesting that, if anything, displaced individuals are less educated than their stayer
counterparts. Education is controlled for in all subsequent regressions.
3 Empirical strategy
This section outlines the identification strategy employed to measure the eﬀect of displacement on labour
market outcomes and then discusses and test possible sources of inconsistency in this strategy.
3.1 Individual Heterogeneity and Displacement
Measuring the eﬀect of conflict-induced displacement on labour market outcomes at the individual level
presents the challenge that displacement status is likely correlated to labour market outcomes through
the unobserved ability component. The main regression model estimated in this study is the following
yit = β
0
1Xit +Diγ1 + ηi + ωit, (1)
where yit is the outcome of interest (labour market outcomes) for individual i in year t, Xit a vector of
exogenous individual characteristics, Di is a dummy for individual (time invariant) displacement status,
and ηi is the unobserved individual heterogeneity. I assume that displacement status is a function of
personal characteristics Zi, the incidence of conflict in the municipality of origin Co, economic conditions
in the municipality of origin relative to "the rest of the world" po, a component of unobserved individual
heterogeneity νi and a random shock u. Subscripts i and o respectively designate individual specific
characteristics and municipality of origin characteristics. I denote the discrete choice function associated
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to displacement status as
Di = F (Zi, Co, po, νi, u) = 1{E[UD(Zi, Co, po, νi, u)− US(Zi, Co, po, νi, u)] > 0}. (2)
Individuals base their displacement decision on the expected net variation in utility (noting as UD(·)
and US(·) the respective utility functions of a displaced and of a stayer). The comparative static on
F (·) in the various parameters is a priori ambiguous except in relative local economic performance p.
Intuitively, ∂(UD − US)/∂p < 0 since good local economic conditions are likely to act as a "pull" factor,
all else being equal.
It seems plausible that (unobserved) parameters p and ν partly determine post-conflict labour market
outcomes and, therefore, estimating (1) using OLS will likely produce inconsistent estimates of the eﬀect
of displacement. Moreover, this source of endogeneity cannot be addressed by exploiting the longitudinal
nature of the LBiH dataset. First, displacement is a time invariant variable and therefore its impact
on labour market outcomes cannot be computed using fixed-eﬀect estimates. Second, using the random
component model requires that the component of unobserved heterogeneity ηi be uncorrelated to all
parameters in (1), but this assumption is likely to be violated, causing the estimates to be biased. The
displacement decision as estimated in a linear probability model is
Di = β
0
2Zi + Coδ + poϕ+ νi + u. (3)
Suppose that a is the coeﬃcient obtained when estimating a linear regression of νi on ηi (such that
νi = ηia+ ), the bias in the unconditional OLS estimate of γ1 in (1) can be written as
p lim γ1OLS = γ1 + a(σ
2
µi
/σ2Di).
Assuming that displacement has a negative eﬀect on work and that higher ability is positively corre-
lated to a higher propensity to be displaced (a > 0), then using simple OLS/GLS to estimate (1) results,
in absolute terms, in a downward biased estimate of the eﬀect of displacement. Conversely, if ability is
negatively correlated to the propensity to choose displacement, then the OLS/GLS estimates produce (in
absolute terms) an upward biased estimate of the negative eﬀect of displacement on work.
3.2 Displacement and Violence across Municipalities
A way to address the problem of endogeneity between the displacement decision and labour market
outcomes is to instrument for displacement. From (2), an obvious candidate to serve as instrumental
variable is the incidence of conflict in the municipality of origin Co. Casualties are used in this study as
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they are likely to constitute a good proxy for the level of violence against Bosnians and are available at
the municipality level (RDCS, cf. data Appendix).19
For Co to be a valid exclusion restriction, it needs to be exogenous to labour market outcomes. Of
particular concern is that local economic performance po might have aﬀected local conflict incidence.
Assume that the level of casualties is a linear function of local economic performance plus an error term
(Co = cpo + ) and that economic performance in the municipality of origin is (positively) correlated to
post-war labour market outcomes through the component of unobserved heterogeneity ηi: (ηi = bpo+ u,
where b > 0 and u is an error term). The probability limit of the IV estimator of the unconditional eﬀect
of displacement using Co as an instrument for displacement is
p lim γ1IV = γ1[1 + b/(ϕ+ δc)].
The sign of the bias is a priori ambiguous and depends on the values taken by ϕ and c. Notice that
the first stage equation is now
Di = β
0
2Zi + Co(δ + ϕ/c) + u.
Assuming that, in line with the idea that a higher level of violence resulted in higher displacement,
(δ + ϕ/c) > 0. Then, if c > 0 and violence is positively correlated to economic performance, the IV
estimates will be, in absolute terms, upward biased. Conversely, if c < 0 and violence is negatively
correlated to economic performance, the IV will produce a downward biased estimate of γ1.
Historical evidence suggests, however, that casualties were not determined by economic performance
at the local level, as Serb attacks primarily aimed at territorial separation and ethnic cleansing of their
acquired territories. The evolution of the front lines between 1992-95 clearly suggests that violence
followed a geo-strategic course from the Serbian border to the West of the country (Burg and Shoup,
1999). Similarly, a UN report on the pattern of Serb attacks confirms this idea (UN, 1994, as cited in
Bulutgil, 2004), :
The method by which the campaign of “ethnic cleansing” was carried out ensured that,
comparatively, the most brutal and inhumane treatment of those detained occurred within
the geographic arc following the Sava and the Drina Rivers of the former Yugoslavia. [...] For
it is within this region of Bosnia Herzegovina that the Serbs required absolute control in order
to establish a separate nation with contiguous borders and an uncompromised geographic link
with Serbia and Montenegro. That control required the subjugation, if not the disappearance,
of the non-Serb populations of the area.
19The total number of casualties is 64,036 for Bosnians and 24,905 for Serbs, of which soliders constituted 52 and 84
percent respectively.
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Bulutgil’s (2004) attempt to formally documents this claim using data on ethnicity from the 1991
census and other sources of data on strategic position (distance to Serbian border, elevation, the geography
of Serb attacks and areas of control) corroborates this notion.
The economic part of the 1991 Census is not available as of now and thus cannot be used to verify
this assumption. However, I carry out two robustness checks on the validity of this assumption.
3.2.1 First stage estimates
In this subsection I present the first-stage estimates, regressing a dummy for displacement status on the
level of casualties in the municipality of origin. In formulas,
Di = β
0
2X + Casualtiesoδ + , (4)
whereDi is a binary variable indicating individual displacement status andX some observed individual
characteristics. The data and computations employed to build Casualtieso are detailed in the data
appendix. Table 6 presents the results of the first stage estimation.20
Overall, these results confirm that the intensity of the conflict as measured by casualties is a good
predictor of the individual propensity to migrate and that a higher level of casualties results in an
increase in the propensity to migrate for Bosnians. The F-statistics for the unconditional specification
(with standard errors clustered at the level of the municipality of destination) are 23 and 31 for men and
women respectively.
3.2.2 Robustness Checks
Falsification Exercise on the First-Stage Estimates First, I perform a falsification exercise on
the first-stage. Should 1992-95 casualties explain pre-war migrations, then this would suggest that my
instrument is picking up economic disparities across municipalities rather than the real eﬀect of violence
as a "push" factor in the displacement decision. I use the fact that the municipality of birth and the
last migration to date, whether in the 1992-2001 period or earlier, are recorded for all individuals in the
data. I use the group of pre-1992 migrants to check whether the level of casualties in their municipality
of birth (assuming this was their municipality of origin) can predict pre-war migration patterns. This
20As the treatment variable is binary, the interpretation of the coeﬃcient on displacement measured is not directly
obvious. As exposed by Manning (2004), in order for the estimation to capture the ATE, the predicted values of the
treatment conditional on the instruments need to be concentrated around 0 and 1. The support of the first-stage predictions
(Figure not reported, see Kondylis, 2007b) suggests that it is the case. Moreover, in the presence of heterogenous treatment
eﬀects, the relationship between the mean of the dependent, conditional on the instrument, and the treatment variable,
also conditioned on the instrument, is by construction non-linear. In the absence of an adequate functional form to
model this non-linearity, stringent distributional assumptions would have to be made on the treatment variable to retrieve
an instrument-independent measure of the treatment on the treated and of the ATE. Hence, the identification strategy
proposed in this study captures an instrument-dependent measure of the ATE and only has internal validity.
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is a particularly powerful test to verify that the conflict did not particularly target some areas based
on economic performance, simply "accelerating" economic migrations that would have happened in the
longer run in the absence of violence.
All individuals who report having ever moved, including those displaced persons whose pre-war mu-
nicipality is not the same as their municipality of birth, are included into the group of non-war migrants.
The proportion of non-war migrants thus obtained is 23 percent of the whole sample. The municipality of
destination is, in this framework, set to be the pre-war municipality for the groups of non-war migrants,
war displaced and stayers alike. The control group now consists of the stayers and the displaced who
never moved before being displaced.21 In formulas
Mi = β
0
3X + CasualtiesBδ2 + 
0,
where Mi is a dummy for non-conflict migration and CasualtiesB is the level of casualties in the
municipality of origin, in this case the municipality of birth. The results corroborate the idea that pre-
war economic performance did not determine conflict incidence as proxied by local war casualties and
therefore cannot predict (mostly economic) pre-war migrations (Table 7). The regression specifications
are identical as those reported in Table 6 except for the change in dependent variable. The eﬀect of
casualties is negative, small and insignificant in all regressions, except when municipality of destination
fixed-eﬀects are included, when the coeﬃcients are significant but virtually equal to zero. The R-squared
associated to the unconditional specifications (columns 1 and 4) is 0.
Local Educational Attainment and Casualties Second, I check whether casualties can predict
pre-war educational attainment for those individuals who were 18 years-old and above in 1992. Insofar
as educational attainment is a good proxy for local prosperity, this provides a more direct check on the
assumption that pre-war local economic performance does not predict war casualties.
To this eﬀect, I regress the level of violence in the pre-war municipality of residence, as proxied by the
proportion of casualties (Casualties) on educational attainment at the individual level for those aged 27
and above in 2001. A set of dummies is used to indicate the level of violence. Namely, the distribution of
the proportion of casualties over the total population in the municipality of origin is split into 5 groups: 0-
20th, 20-40th, 40-60th, 60-80th, and 80-100th percentiles (as compared to national levels of casualties).22
I use two dummies for educational attainment: one for medium education (complete or incomplete high
school, Educ_Medium) and one for high education (above complete high school, Educ_High) measured
21 I also ran the same regression restricting the control group to stayers and obtain the same results.
22For instance, the “Violence 0-20 percentile” takes value 1 if the individual’s pre-war municipality experienced a level of
casualties in the first 20 percentiles of the distribution and zero otherwise.
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relative to low education (primary school completed and below). Individual characteristics (X) are also
included. In formulas,
Casualties = α+Educ_Mediumβ1 +Educ_Highβ2 + γ
0X + .
The results reported in Table 8 reinforce the historically documented idea that the intensity of the
conflict was determined more by geo-strategic motives rather than economic motives.23 The coeﬃcients
on the two education dummies are significant in most specifications (cols. 4-6). For each specification,
the coeﬃcients on medium and high education bear the same sign, which tends to suggest that those
specifications are picking up genuine regional variations in wealth. However, there is no linear eﬀect (col.
1) and the signs vary across the range of the distribution of violence (cols. 2-6), indicating that the
relationship between wealth and conflict incidence is not monotonic across ranges of the distribution of
violence.
3.3 Displacement and Municipality of Destination
There are three concerns related to the spatial sorting of the displaced population: self-selection in the
municipality of destination, the impact of inflows of displaced, and the impact of the local violence on
economic performance. A displaced person is likely to self-select into her municipality of destination
based on observed and unobserved characteristics, and the instrumental variable strategy proposed in
this study does not address this issue. In the absence of a credible instrument I purge the estimates of
this source of inconsistency by including municipality of destination fixed-eﬀects in all regressions. Since
less than 50 percent of displaced individuals resettled in their municipality of origin, the coeﬃcient on
the eﬀect of displacement using variations in violence across municipalities of origin in the first stage is
still identified when municipality of destination fixed-eﬀects are added in the second stage.
Inflows of displaced may also impact the economic performance of the municipality of destination. In
this study, stayers are used as a control group to measure the eﬀect of displacement on the displaced after
resettlement in BiH. Although the impact of (net) inflows of displaced on the population of stayers is
not directly measured, this eﬀect is implicitly contained in the estimates of displacement proposed in this
study.24 As there are substantial variations in the inflow of displaced and returnees across municipalities,
23 I also run the same set of regressions splitting the sample along gender lines and find that the coeﬃcients are not
aﬀected (results not reported for brevity).
24Numerous studies document the eﬀect of immigrant inflows on the natives’ labour market outcomes. For instance, Card
(1990) finds that the Mariel boat-lift had no impact on local wages and unemployment rate, even among the population of
immigrants from earlier waves of migration, and argues that this is due to the capacity of Miami’s labour market to adjust
to this increase in immigrant labour force. Dustmann et al. (2005) look at immigration to the UK and find it had no overall
significant eﬀect on the natives. Conversely, Hunt (1992) looks at the impact of the massive waves of repatriation from
Algeria into France after the independence war, and finds a negative eﬀect on the non-repatriates’ labour market outcomes.
Interestingly, she finds no evidence of a decrease in immigration to places where the proportion of repatriates were high.
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including municipality of destination fixed-eﬀects should account for local disparities in the inflow of
displaced persons, together with other local labour market conditions. The eﬀect of high of migration
inflows is ambiguous, as those inflows have both supply and demand eﬀects that are likely to go in
opposite directions. A large inflow of displaced people might have a negative impact on the stayers’ labour
market outcomes by creating an over-supply of labour, which would lead the estimates to understate the
(negative) eﬀect of displacement in those regions more aﬀected. Additionally, that some displaced persons
return in higher number to their municipality of origin is likely to have a positive eﬀect on their labour
market outcomes by enhancing their ability to rely on her pre-war informal networks. There also are
important eﬀects on the demand side, as higher levels of in-migration also increase the demand for labour.
Finally, an additional source of concern is that the number of casualties during the war might determine
the economic performance of a given municipality. Particularly, in the case of displaced persons who
returned to their municipality of origin, then the instrumented displacement status would be correlated to
the municipality of destination fixed-eﬀect in the second stage. Since casualties and economic performance
are likely to be negatively correlated, this would cause the IV estimates of the eﬀect of displacement to
be, in absolute terms, downward biased in the case of a positive eﬀect and upward bias in the case of a
negative eﬀect.25 As discussed in section 1.1, a massive construction eﬀort was undertaken in the years
immediately after the end of the war. I use the fact that interviewers recorded housing conditions (good,
incomplete, devastated, bad) for each household they visited to run regressions of housing conditions on
level casualties in the municipality of destination at the household level (results not reported). I find that
casualties have no explanatory power in all specifications except for the "incomplete" category. However,
the associated R-squared is below 0.1 percent. Moreover, only 1.81 and 1.61 percent of the total sample of
Bosnian households have a house in "incomplete" and "devastated" conditions respectively, implying that
reconstruction was to a large extent successful. This reinforces the idea that casualties and municipality
of destination fixed-eﬀects should not be strongly associated in the labour market specifications.
Angrist and Kugler (2003) look at the impact of immigration from the Balkans and into Europe on natives’ labour market
outcomes. Although they find no overall eﬀect, their results suggest that the eﬀect of immigration in more protective states
is significantly negative. Dustmann et al. (2005) and Glitz (2006) also find a heterogenous eﬀect across levels of educational
attainment.
25 In the results section, I show that the eﬀect of displacement on work is negative. As the bias in the GLS and this
potential source of bias go in the same directions, the GLS and IV estimates hence oﬀer "bounds" to the true value of the
coeﬃcient.
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4 Results
4.1 Displacement and Labour Market Performance
In this section, I turn to the central investigation of the eﬀect of displacement on the labour market
outcomes of the displaced as measured from the 2001/04 LBiH panel data.26 The sample is restricted to
18-64 year olds Bosnian and split along gender lines. A number of labour market outcome variables (work,
unemployment and inactivity status, the natural log of hourly wage, and hours worked, including and
excluding zeros) are regressed on a dummy for displacement status, controlling for a variety of observed
and unobserved individual and municipality characteristics.27 This amounts to estimating the equation
yit = β
0
1Xit +Diγ1 + µt + ηi + ωit, (5)
where the error term contains a time-invariant individual heterogeneity component and in some spec-
ifications Xit includes municipality of destination fixed-eﬀects. Tables 9 and 10 report the GLS RE and
G2SLS RE estimates of the impact of displacement on work, unemployment, inactivity, wage, and hours
for men and women respectively. Columns (1) to (3) show the results of GLS RE estimation and G2SLS
RE estimates are reported in columns (4) to (6). Columns (1) and (4) present the unconditional eﬀect of
displacement, while the estimates conditional on exogenous individual characteristics and on municipality
of destination fixed-eﬀects are reported in columns (2) and (5) and columns (3) and (6) respectively.
The unconditional eﬀect of displacement on work for Bosnian men is large, negative, and significant,
implying a fall in the probability to be in work by 10 percentage points (Table 9, col. 1). Controlling for
individual characteristics increases the point estimates (col. 2), and although the inclusion of municipality
fixed-eﬀects washes out part of the eﬀect (now 0.071), the coeﬃcient on displacement remains negative
and significant (col. 3). It is quite important to note that, although the coeﬃcient of interest varies
sensibly across specifications, the standard errors on the parameter of interest are virtually unaﬀected by
the inclusion of municipality fixed-eﬀects. This suggests that adding municipality of destination fixed-
eﬀects, while controlling for unobserved local conditions, does not absorb all the variations in the eﬀect
of displacement.
The eﬀect of displacement on men’s unemployment is large, positive, and significant in all specifica-
tions (cols. 1-3), associated to an increase in unemployment ranging from 10 to 15 percentage points.
Parameter constancy cannot be rejected across specifications. These results suggest that, despite a fall in
26Since IV is used for a binary endogenous covariate, using a linear probability model is the correct way to to estimate
the system. I compare results from GLS and 2GSLS estimation with the pooled ordinary least squares estimation and find
similar point estimates and standard errors.
27Controls include a time trend, dummies for household status, dummies for marital status, individual age-group dummies
(four years by four years from 23 to 62 and one for 63-64), household composition variables (number of dependent members
aged 0, 1-5, 6-10, 11-15, and 16-17), and dummies for educational attainment (medium and high, relative to low).
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employment, displacement has no eﬀect on Bosnian men’s participation rate. I find no significant eﬀect
on wage and hours worked.28
The estimates of displacement on work for Bosnian women are qualitatively similar to those for
Bosnian men, although of a lower magnitude, implying a fall in work on the order of 5 to 7 percentage
points (Table 10). However, the coeﬃcient on unemployment is only significantly positive in columns
(1) and (2), and the inclusion of municipality fixed-eﬀects indicates that the eﬀect of displacement on
unemployment for this group is entirely attributable to local labour market characteristics (col. 3). As
with the men, I find no significant eﬀect of displacement on wage and hours of work for Bosnian women.
G2SLS Estimates
The eﬀect of displacement on labour market outcomes is now estimated using the Balestra and Varadharajan-
Krishnakumar (1987) generalised two-stage least squares (G2SLS) estimation for the one-way error com-
ponent model. Displacement is instrumented using the level of casualties in the municipality of origin
(equation 4) as shown in Table 6. The results are presented, as described above, in columns (4) to (6) of
Tables 9 and 10 for men and women respectively.
Although qualitatively in line with the one-step estimates of displacement in most specifications, the
results from the IV estimates for the men provide evidence of selection into displacement amongst Bosnian
men and women. Indeed, the IV estimates of the eﬀect of displacement on work and unemployment are in
absolute terms systematically above those obtained with the one-step GLS, implying a positive correlation
between the latent eﬀect of displacement and the probability of work. For Bosnian men, displacement is
now associated to a fall in work by 10 to 22 percentage points and to an increase in unemployment by 15
to 30 percent across specifications (cols. 4-6), although parameter constancy cannot be rejected. There
still is no significant eﬀect of displacement on Bosnian men’s participation, wage, and hours.
For Bosnian women, the IV estimates indicate significant positive selection into displacement, both on
work and inactivity. Indeed, rather interestingly, and in contrast with the results for men, the estimates
of the eﬀect of displacement for Bosnian women now imply a fall in work by 14-15 percentage points, an
increase in inactivity by 11-18 percentage points, with no eﬀect on unemployment. These results indicate
that the latent eﬀect of displacement is, in the case of Bosnian women, not only positively correlated to
a higher probability of being in work but also to higher participation in the labour market.
28The eﬀect on hours is only significant in the unconditional model when zeros are included, which suggests that the
eﬀect is entirely attributable to a diﬀerence in employment across groups and to observable characteristics and local labour
market conditions.
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4.2 Patterns of Assimilation
Tables 11 and 12 report patterns of assimilation of the displaced into the labour market for men and
women respectively. The empirical framework is straightforward: a dummy for displacement status is
interacted with a years-since-return variable (Y SR) and its square.29 Y SR is measured as the number
of years the person reports having spent in her current place of residence. In the data, the mean of Y SR
is 5.4 years for displaced men and 4.6 for women. Year of return cohort eﬀects are also controlled for
by including year-of-return cohort dummies (Y OR).30 The structure of Tables 11 and 12 is similar to
that of Tables 9 and 10. For brevity only 2 specifications are reported: one including all controls and
municipality fixed-eﬀects and another further adding Y OR fixed-eﬀects. Hence the following equation is
now estimated:
yit = β
0
1Xit +Ditγ11 +DitD
0
it ∗ Y SR.γ12 +DitD0it ∗ Y SR2.γ13 + Y ORi.δ + uit, (6)
where the error term contains a time-invariant individual heterogeneity component and in some spec-
ifications Xi includes municipality fixed-eﬀects.
The results for Bosnian men and women exhibit appreciable diﬀerences across methods of estimation.
Overall, the one-step estimates fail to isolate any pattern of assimilation of the displaced into the labour
market, with the exception of a convex-shaped decrease in inactivity over-time with no initial diﬀerential.
The eﬀects of displacement on work and unemployment upon arrival (not interacted) are of a similar
magnitude to those obtained in Table 9. As displacement and its interactions are instrumented (lower
panel), all estimates are imprecise, and the non-interacted coeﬃcient on displacement is only significant
in the unemployment specification. This suggests the power of the instrument is insuﬃcient to allow for
identification of the interactions.
The results for Bosnian women imply a significant and positive relationship between Y SR and the
probability of work when IV is used (cols. 7, 8). However, the estimates are too imprecise to establish
the nature of the transition. Overall, those results tend to suggest that, although significant patterns of
assimilation are found for women, the instrument is not powerful enough to provide precise estimates of
assimilation patterns.
29Since some sorting might have taken place across years, one would ideally want to instrument for years since return
(Y SR). However, in the absence of a valid instrument, only ditd0it ∗Y SR and its square are instrumented using interactions
between the instruments and Y SR and its square.
30This empirical strategy is identical to that used by Borjas (1987) and Hu (2000) to look at immigrants’ assimilation
patterns. I use a simple concave function of labour market outcomes in years since return, although diﬀerences in the rate
of assimilation across years of return cannot be measured given the size of the samples and the potential issue of low power
of the instrument. Instead, year-of-return fixed-eﬀects are included, as suggested by Hu (2000) and Borjas (1987). Hence,
these results provide a measure of the "average" rate of assimilation across all return-cohorts.
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4.3 The Eﬀect of Schooling
Tables 13 and 14 investigate the eﬀect of education on the labour market outcomes of the displaced for
men and women respectively. Empirically, a variety of labour market outcomes are regressed on a dummy
for displacement, a dummy for having medium or high education (Med_High_Educ, relative to low),
and the interaction between the displacement and education dummies.31 The structure of Tables 13 and
14 is similar to that of Tables 9 and 10. For brevity the results for the unconditional specification are
not reported. In formulas,
yit = β
0Xit +Dit.γ +Med_High_Educ.δ11 +DitD0it ∗Med_High_Educ.δ12 + uit, (7)
where the error term contains a time-invariant individual heterogeneity component and in some spec-
ifications X includes municipality fixed-eﬀects.
The results show that education, while significant in aﬀecting labour market outcomes in all specifica-
tions, does not have any additional eﬀect for the displaced. Although the interaction between the dummy
for education and the dummy for displaced status is significant in the one-step work and unemployment
estimations for men (Table 13, col. 1), this result is not robust to the inclusion of municipality fixed-
eﬀects (cols.2, 4). As noted above, those results corroborate the notion that the power of our instrument
does allow precise identification of interactions terms.
4.4 Robustness Checks
4.4.1 Border Municipalities
The municipalities now situated on the border between the FBH and the RS might not be a representative
sample before or after the war. Therefore, it is of concern that the population who originated from these
municipalities could systematically diﬀer from the rest of BiH or that the fighting in these regions was
particularly intense relative to the rest of the country.32 For instance, as the distance across entity is
small along the border, it might be that displacement out of these municipality was unrepresentative of
the rest of BiH. Moreover, these regions’ infrastructures might have suﬀered more war damages than the
rest of the territory and have triggered particularly massive out-migration. These diﬀerences would aﬀect
the first-stage and results overall. As a check, I remove all individuals whose municipality of origin was
31 In the absence of a credible instrument for education the estimates of the returns to education cannot be purged from
the (positive) correlation between the latent eﬀect of education and labour market outcomes (Card, 2001; Hausman and
Taylor, 1981). In this exercise, however, measuring those returns is not the main endeavour. In contrast, this specification
is estimated to test whether the displacement interaction bears any significance. Hence my estimates are likely to be flawed,
either upwardly biased as a consequence of unobserved ability or downwardly biased resulting from a supply-side eﬀect
(Card, 2001).
32As documented by Burg and Shoup (1999), the Dayton borders were placed on the 1994 front lines.
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situated on the Dayton border and who have moved as a result of the conflict.33 The results are presented
in Tables 15 and 16 for men and women respectively. Although the large reduction in sample sizes aﬀects
the precision of the estimates in some specifications, the point estimates are remarkably similar relative
to the full sample (Tables 9 and 10) parameter constancy can never be rejected at conventional levels.
4.4.2 Disruption in Schooling
Another source of concern is that the eﬀect of the conflict is likely to be heterogenous across age groups.
For instance, in the case of an individual still of schooling age, the conflict is likely to disrupt her study
and/or delay her entry on the labour market. Conflict related interruptions are, therefore, likely to have
diﬀerent long term eﬀects across age groups, and it is of interest to check whether removing the sub-
sample who was of age 18 and below in 1992 changes the results substantially.34 The results are presented
in Tables 17 and 18. The results for Bosnian men and women are remarkably similar across the full and
restricted samples. These results suggest no strong disparities in the eﬀect of displacement across age
groups and that the negative eﬀect of displacement measured on the full sample is not attributable to
long term eﬀects associated to disruption in schooling for the youngest age cohorts.
5 Discussion
5.1 The Nature of Conflict-Induced Displacement in BiH
The first main contribution of this study is to the understanding of displacement in a context of conflict by
formally documenting the selection into displacement. The IV estimates support the idea that displaced
Bosnians positively self-selected into displacement, meaning that those who were "more able" in labour-
market terms were more likely to decide to out-migrate. "More able" does not specifically refer to higher
cognitive abilities, but also to a better access to social networks outside the pre-war residence, which is
likely to enhance post-displacement job prospects. This is rather intuitive since, as displacement is likely
associated to a substantial loss of assets, having good post-displacement employment prospects is likely
to increase the probability of displacement by providing a form of insurance.
That the latent eﬀect of displacement is positively correlated to inactivity for Bosnian women is
also rather interesting. One possibility is that male household members’ labour market abilities weigh
more than female members’ in the household displacement decision. Intra-households allocations might
operate in such a way that male members of the household engage in labour market participation while
33 In reality, conditioning both on originating from and moving to a border municipality would constitute a better check.
However, since the choice of the municipality of destination is an outcome variable in itself, it would lead to biased results.
34Another way to check for heterogeneity of the eﬀect of displacement across age groups would be to interact dummies
for age groups and displacement. However, the power of our instrument would not allow for the interactions to be precisely
identified.
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female members devote themselves to household production, thus appearing as inactive under the ILO
definition.35 However that does not mean that they are not part of an active search, since male members
might include them in their job-search. By isolating the marked disparities in the eﬀect on labour
outcomes across gender lines, this study suggests that the nature of the conflict as well as cultural and
sociological channels play important roles in determining the resettlement experience for the displaced.
5.2 The Cost of Displacement
The second main contribution of this study is to measure the cost of displacement in terms of labour
market outcomes for displaced Bosnians. The results imply a significant and large cost, as displaced
Bosnians, men and women alike, are less likely to be in work by about 15 percentage points.
Numerous studies suggest that networks are likely to play an important role in providing access to
informal labour markets and credit in an informal economy and/or in a context of displacement. Edin
et al. (2003) find that living in an enclave is likely to enhance the access to informal ethnic networks
and improve immigrants’ access to employment by improving the performance of refugee immigrants’
job-search. Damm (2006) exploits a change in the Danish policy for immigrants’ settlement to isolate
the eﬀect of living in an ethnic enclave on immigrants’ labour market outcomes and finds evidence of
negative self-selection into segregated neighbourhoods together with positive returns to living in ‘ghettos’.
The literature on migration network also isolates some positive eﬀect of having more developed migration
networks in the place on migration on immigrants’ labour market outcomes (cf. Bauer et al., 2000). More
specifically, the literature on informality and vulnerability in post-conflict BiH (Bank, 1999) leads us to
interpret these findings as a consequence of displaced persons having poorer access to social networks,
although this assumption cannot be tested formally with the data at hand.
The ineﬃcient nature of the formal labour market and the high levels of informality in BiH are also
good candidates to rationalize the lower access to employment measured for Bosnians. Institutional
design is the main reason raised by the Bank to explain the ineﬃciencies of the informal labour market
(Bank, 2002).36 The absence of an additional eﬀect of education tends to confirm the existence of such
ineﬃciencies, insofar as it shows that displaced educated workless individuals cannot use their additional
skills to increase the eﬃciency of their search within the existing unemployment infrastructures. Moreover,
looking at descriptive statistics on the sectors of occupation (primary, secondary, and tertiary) and the
35Displacement and the lack of formal property rights are also likely to be associated. Field (2002) suggests that in the
absence of property rights a household’s labour supply decreases. As mentioned earlier, our specifications cannot account
for housing conditions.
36Despite the existence of Employment Institutes (EI) at the canton level, responsible for job counseling and job brokerage
in BiH, the Bank reports that those structures are not used by either side of the market. Indeed, and although the direction
of the causality is unclear, the Bank reports that formal job-seekers do not rely on their local EI to find work, and neither
do formal businesses use these structures to post their openings. Moreover, qualitative evidence on the unemployed in BiH
indicates that job-seekers rely on their informal networks as their main source of job oﬀers.
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types of jobs (self-employment, paid employment, and family help) for those in work, as reported in the
LBiH panel (Table 19), whereas the displaced and the stayers who are in work are equally represented in
various sectors, the displaced are more likely to be self-employed and less likely to be in paid employment
relative to stayers. Although the inference cannot be drawn from this descriptive evidence, this indicates
two things. First, that they are similarly represented across sectors reinforces the idea that displaced
persons have the same qualifications as stayers. Second, it corroborates the notion that the displaced
have poorer access to informal networks and, therefore, are less likely to be in paid employment.
The finding that, in the case of Bosnian men, lower employment does not translate into a higher
probability of inactivity relative to their stayer counterparts but into higher unemployment, is open
to a number of interpretations. One is that displaced Bosnian men, having lost relatively more assets
during the war than their stayer counterparts, cannot "aﬀord" idleness. Another explanation, which
links back to the idea that there are large ineﬃciencies and informality in the labour market, is that a
displaced person’s job search is of a diﬀerent nature in a mostly informal labour market than that of
a stayer. As Wahba and Zenou (2005) document for Egypt, a well-connected workless person is more
likely to engage in "hidden" or "passive" unemployment, i.e. to rely on her employed relations to inform
her of job opportunities and, thus, less likely to be categorised as unemployed according to the ILO
definition. Conversely, a non-connected person cannot rely on a "passive" job-search and is more likely
to be categorised as unemployed. Hence, that the participation rate for stayers is lower relative to that
of their displaced counterparts might be an artefact and simply reflect the diﬀerent natures of the job
search across displacement status. Since displaced individuals are, all else being equal, less likely to be in
work, this nonetheless indicates that the quality of a displaced person’s search is poorer that of a stayers
and that conducting an "active" job search does not enhance access to employment. Such mechanisms
would help explain the high levels of inactivity among men (on the order of 20 percent). Overall, these
results raise particular concern for the economic vulnerability of displaced persons in BiH.
Employment interruption could also be an explanation for the findings of poorer job-access for dis-
placed Bosnians. When a person is displaced, she might be more likely to become workless and to remain
so during her exile. Some studies have suggested that employers might implement a "ranking" system,
whereby those unemployed for longer period of times are, all else equal, less likely to be hired (Diamond
and Blanchard, 1994). As the duration of the exile is not observed, but only the date of return, this
assumption cannot be formally tested. Moreover, it is a priori not obvious that the 1992-95 war was a
less disruptive experience for displaced than for stayers in terms of employment disruption.
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6 Conclusion
The last 40 years have seen an increase in the incidence and the average length of civil conflicts (Azam
et al., 2001). As the link between conflict resurgence and poverty is well established in the literature,
promoting sustainable economic growth in a post-conflict context is a compelling priority because dis-
placement is associated to high economic vulnerability. Studying access to the labour market for the
displaced seems particularly important.
The central contributions of this study to the literature on the economics of civil conflict are twofold:
first, it documents the nature of the selection of Bosnian men and women into displacement during
the 1992/95 BiH war; and second, it oﬀers a measure of the eﬀect of displacement on the post-war
labour market outcomes of the displaced. Furthermore, this study highlights the diﬀering selection into
displacement along gender lines and the impact of informal job markets on participation for the displaced.
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A Data Appendix: Constructed Variables
Conflict induced displacement
Two self-reported outcomes are used to further check for coherence in the definition of displacement:
"what was the main reason for moving?" with the categories: war, property occupied, property dev-
astated, security, no adequate living conditions, family reasons, job, health, other, and "what is your
status in your current place of residence?" with the categories: permanent residence-with no moving
during the war, permanent residence: displaced person/returnee, permanent residence: refugee/returnee,
temporary residence: displaced person, temporary residence: refugee/displaced person, temporary resi-
dence: refugee, temporary residence: other. The suggested categories are rather wide, and using those
self-reported outcomes to define displacement is not desirable. As a robustness check I exclude from the
group of displaced those who declared having moved due to family or economic reasons as well as those
who reported that their current status in their residence was "permanent, with no move during the war".
I find this does not aﬀect the results.
Labour Market Outcomes
Our definition of "work" corresponds to those having reported doing any work during the survey week.
Unemployment status is defined using the ILO definition37, i.e. those having taken any step towards
finding a job in the last month as opposed to referring to those registered within the unemployment
bureau.38 The inactive are those neither in work, unemployed, nor attending school. I use reported usual
weekly hours to measure hours of work and exclude zeros in all subsequent computations. The hourly
wage rate is built using reported usual hours of work and the last salary received for a given period of
work. Log-linear regressions are reported for the wage eﬀects.
Proxies for local level of violence
The proportion of casualties as a proportion of the total pre-war population (Casualties) is computed at
the municipality level using the RDCS population loss data (by municipality of suﬀering) and the 1991
population census. The RDCS used records the number of casualties by municipality of suﬀering. How-
ever, using the municipality of origin of the municipality of suﬀering only aﬀects the figures substantially
37 In the data, among those who qualified as unemployed using the ILO definition, only 65.8% were registered with the
unemployment bureau. Moreover, among those in work, 33.3% declared being registered as well, compared to only 13.7%
of the inactive. The access to unemployment benefits (UB) in BiH is virtually inexistent. Indeed, only 0.22% of those
registered with the unemployment bureau in the first wave (the only wave where UB were surveyed) reported benefiting
from UB in the form of a cash transfer.
38Fares and Tiongson (2007) report a "routing" error in the data that prevents them from exploiting transitions from and
into unemployment variable for 2003 wave of the panel. As we do not exploit job history but current occupation, this does
not aﬀect us. I check that our calculations are unchanged whether I include that year or not, and that the unemployment
rate remains remarkably stable across waves.
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for Srebrenica. This casualty data is matched to the panel by pre-war municipality of residence.
References
Angrist, J. & Kugler, A. (2003), ‘Protective or counter-productive? Labour market institutions and the
eﬀect of immigration on EU natives’, The Economic Journal 113.
Azam, J., Collier, P. & Hoeﬄer, A. (2001), ‘International policies on civil conflict: An economic perspec-
tive’, Unpublished manuscript, University of Oxford .
Balestra, P. & Varadharajan-Krishnakumar, J. (1987), ‘Full information estimations of a system of si-
multaneous equations with error component structure’, Econometric Theory 3(2).
Ball, P., Tabeau, E. & Verwimp, P. (2007), ‘The Bosnian book of the dead: Assessment of the database’,
RDC Report: http://www.idc.org.ba/presentation/Executive02007.zip.
Bank, W. (1999), ‘Bosnia and Herzegovina 1996-1998 - lessons and accomplishments: Review of the
priority reconstruction and recovery program’, WB conference Paper .
Bank, W. (2005a), ‘Bosnia and Herzegovina: Country economic memorandum’, The World Bank Group
Publications .
Bank, W. (2005b), ‘Bosnia and Herzegovina, labour market update: The role of industrial relations’,
World Bank Report of the Human Development Sector Unit - Europe and Central Asia Region
32650-BA.
Bauer, T., Epstein, G. & Gang, I. (2000), ‘What are Migration Networks?’, IZA Discussion Paper Series
No 200.
Bigombe, B., Collier, P. & Sambanis, N. (2000), ‘Policies for Building Post-Conflict Peace’, The Journal
of African Economies 9(3).
Blanchard, O. & Diamond, P. (1994), ‘Ranking, unemployment duration and wages’, Review of Economic
Studies 61, 417—434.
Blattman, C. (2006), ‘The Consequences of Child Soldiering’, unpublished manuscript, Department of
Economics, UC Berkeley .
Borjas, G. (1987), ‘Self-selection and the earnings of immigrants’, The American Economic Review
77(4), 531—553.
25
Bulutgil, H. (2004), ‘Violence in Bosnia-Herzegovina 1992-95: Fear, strategy, or exclusive political imag-
ination’, Mimeo, University of Chicago .
Burg, L. & Shoup, P. (1999), The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Ethnic Conflict and International Inter-
vention, Armonk N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe.
Card, D. (1990), ‘The Impact of the Mariel Boatllift on the Miami Labor Market’, Industrial and Labor
Relations Review 43(2), 245—257.
Card, D. (2001), ‘Estimating the return to schooling: Progress on some persistent econometric problems’,
Econometrica 69(5).
Chiswick, B. (1999), ‘Are immigrants favorably selected?’, The American Economic Review 89(2), 181—
185.
CIET, I. (1997), ‘Vulnerability study’, CIET Regional Vulnerability Assessment Series .
Collier, P. (2003), Breaking the Conflict Trap - Civil War and Development Policy, World Bank and
Oxford University Press.
Coulon, A. D. (2005), ‘More on the employment eﬀect of recent immigration: Switzerland in the 90’s’,
Mimeo.
Damm, A. (2006), ‘Ethnic enclaves and immigrant labour market outcomes: Quasi-experimental evi-
dence’, Mimeo.
Deininger, K. (2003), ‘Causes and Consequences of Civil Strife: Micro-Level Evidence from Uganda’,
Oxford Economic Paper, New Series 55, 579—606.
Dustmann, C., Fabbri, F. & Preston, I. (2005), ‘The impact of immigration on the UK labour market’,
CREAM Discussion Paper Series 01/05.
Edin, P.-A., Fredriksson, P. & Aslund, O. (2003), ‘Ethnic enclaves and the economic success of immigrants:
Evidence from a natural experiment’, Quarterly Journal of Economics 118(1).
Fares, J. & Tiongson, E. (2007), ‘Youth unemployment, labor market transitions, and scarring: Evidence
from Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2001-04’, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 4183.
Field, E. (2002), ‘Entitled to Work: Urban Property Rights and Labor Supply in Peru’, Quaterly Journal
of Economics (forthcoming).
26
Hausman, J. & Taylor, W. (1981), ‘Panel data and unobservable individual eﬀects’, Econometrica
49(6), 1377—1398.
Hu, W.-Y. (2000), ‘Immigrant earnings assimilation: Estimates from longitudinal data.’, the American
Economic Review 90(2).
Hunt, J. (1992), ‘The Impact of the 1962 Repatriates from Algeria on the French Labor Market’, Industrial
and Labor Relations Review 45(3), 556—572.
Kondylis, F. (2007a), ‘Agricultural Production and Conflict: Quasi-Experimental Evidence from a Policy
Intervention Programme in Rwanda’, Economic Development and Cultural Change (forthcoming).
Kondylis, F. (2007b), A Microeconomic Assessment of the Impact of Civil Conflict and Poverty on
Labour Supply and Human Capital Accumulation in Developing and Transition Economies., PhD
thesis, University of London.
Lazear, E. (1999), ‘Culture and language’, The Journal of Political Economy 107(6, Part 2).
Manning, A. (2004), ‘Instrumental variables for binary treatments with heterogenous treatment eﬀects:
A simple exposition’, Contributions to Economic Analysis and Policy 3(1).
Miguel, E., Satyanath, S. & Sergenti, E. (2004), ‘Economic shocks and civil conflict: An instrumental
variables approach’, Journal of Political Economy 112(4).
Nation, C. (2003), War in the Balkans 1991-2002, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College:
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdﬃles/PUB123.pdf.
RDCS (2007), ‘1992-1995 death count data by municipality of Bosnia and Herzegovina’, Research and
Documentation Centre in Sarajevo website: http://www.idc.org.ba .
Shemyakina, O. (2006), ‘The eﬀect of armed conflict on accumulation of schooling: Results from Tajik-
istan’, Mimeo University of Southern California .
Toal, G. & Dahlman, C. (2004), ‘The Eﬀort to Reverse Ethnic Cleansing in Bosnia-Herzegovina: The
Limits of Returns’, Eurasian Geography and Economics 45(6).
UN (1994), ‘Detention camps’, UN Document (S/1994/674/Annex 4), 12.
UNHCR (1998), ‘Review of the UNHCR Housing Programme in Bosnia and Herzegovina’, Report of the
Inspection and Evaluation Service Eval/05/08.
27
UNHCR (1999), ‘Return, local integration and property rights’, Dayton Peace Agreement Annex 7.
Verwimp, P. (2005), ‘An Economic Profile of Peasant Perpetrator of Genocide: Micro-Level Evidence
from Rwanda’, Journal of Development Economics 77, 297—323.
Wahba, J. & Zenou, Y. (2005), ‘Density, Social Networks and Job Search Methods: Theory and Appli-
cation to Egypt’, Journal of Development Economics 78, 443—473.
28
F
ig
ur
e
1:
A
M
ap
of
th
e
m
un
ic
ip
al
it
ie
s
of
B
os
ni
a
an
d
H
er
ze
go
vi
na
(S
ou
rc
e:
U
N
H
C
R
fo
r
B
os
ni
a
an
d
H
er
ze
go
vi
na
,
01
/1
1/
20
03
).
29
0
.0
2
.0
4
.0
6
.0
8
.1
1992 96 2001
Density kernel density estimate
Figure 2: Histogram and kernel density estimates of the patterns of return migration over-time for
Bosnians in BiH.
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Table 1: Sample sizes, by gender, age group, entity and ethnicity (wave 1 of the panel only).
Age group  All entities  
and ethnicity 
  Federation     Republic   
    All  Bosnian Serb Croat  All Bosnian Serb Croat
Men             
[18 ; 25]  376  202 144 2 36  174 15 157 . 
[26 ; 40]  816  447 360 9 60  369 24 332 3 
[41 ; 60]  1063  565 430 22 84  498 26 466 2 
[61 ; 64]  174  85 59 4 21  89 8 78 1 
 
Women 
            
[18 ; 25]  307  171 142 1 24  136 19 116 . 
[26 ; 40]  829  494 407 8 60  335 14 308 2 
[41 ; 60]  1162  629 476 20 90  533 37 484 7 
[61 ; 64]  229  126 77 13 30  103 8 90 2 
Table 2: Proportion of war migrants by gender, age group, entity and ethnicity (wave 1 of the panel
only).
Age group  All entities  
and ethnicity 
  Federation    Republic  
    All  Bosnian Serb All Bosnian Serb 
[18 ; 25]  0.246  0.150 0.146 0.000  0.349 0.067 0.281
[26 ; 40]  0.223  0.168 0.157 0.005  0.286 0.037 0.249
[41 ; 60]  0.218  0.140 0.125 0.007  0.295 0.040 0.255
[61 ; 64]  0.206  0.106 0.094 0.013  0.291 0.042 0.249
           
Total  0.224  0.149 0.138 0.005  0.302 0.044 0.257
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Table 3: Men’s time use - sample means.
Bosnian Men 
 
Sample Size Work Unemp. Inactive Hours 
      
By Age       
[18 ; 25] 689 0.363 0.464 0.173 42.8 
[26 ; 40] 1525 0.675 0.238 0.087 43.0 
[41 ; 60] 1845 0.693 0.125 0.182 41.5 
[61 ; 64] 
 
301 0.146 0.037 0.817 38.0 
[18 ; 64] 4360 0.597 0.212 0.191 42.2 
By entity    
Republic 296 0.348 0.480 0.172 43.4 
Federation 4064 0.615 0.192 0.192 42.1 
t of difference -- 9.132 11.862 -0.850 0.68 
By displacement status     
Stayers 3557 0.623 0.180 0.197 42.4 
Displaced 803 0.483 0.352 0.164 40.7 
t of difference -- 7.32 -10.93 2.13 1.75  
 
Table 4: Women’s time use - sample means.
Bosnian Women 
 
Sample Size Work Unemp. Inactive Hours 
      
By Age       
[18 ; 25] 641 0.229 0.438 0.332 41.4 
[26 ; 40] 1655 0.302 0.280 0.419 38.5 
[41 ; 60] 2074 0.237 0.118 0.645 37.7 
[61 ; 64] 356 0.037 0.006 0.958 30.6 
[18 ; 64] 4726 0.243 0.210 0.547 38.4 
By entity       
Republic 310 0.219 0.261 0.519 40.2 
Federation 4416 0.245 0.206 0.549 38.3 
t of difference -- -1.022 2.314 -1.010 0.99 
By displacement status     
Stayers 3442 0.262 0.193 0.546 38.6 
Displaced 970 0.194 0.255 0.555 36.1 
t of difference -- 4.81 -4.70 -0.30 2.72 
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Table 5: Eudcational attainment by gender, ethnicity, and displacement status. (wave 1 only).
 No 
schooling
Low 
education
Medium  
education
High 
education 
Men     
All 0.017 0.275 0.616 0.092 
By displacement 
status 
 
Stayers 0.012 0.273 0.605 0.088 
Displaced 0.025 0.309 0.565 0.072 
t of the difference -2.67 -2.03 2.05 1.49 
 
Women 
 
All 0.073 0.533 0.353 0.041 
By displacement 
status 
 
Stayers 0.058 0.532 0.347 0.048 
Displaced 0.091 0.528 0.350 0.019 
t of the difference -3.99 0.28 -0.16 4.48 
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Table 6: First-stage estimates: The eﬀect of the incidence of conflict at the municipality level on individual
displacement decision.
Fist-stage estimates  
 
Men  
 
 
 
Women 
 
 
 
Dependent: Displaced  
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
(4) 
 
(5) 
 
(6) 
Instrument:       
Proportion Missing/Killed 7.769** 7.840** 7.236** 5.642** 5.733** 5.786**
 (1.581) (1.532) (1.049) (1.002) (1.009) (0.928)
Controls 
 
 ? ?  ? ? 
Municipality 
Fixed-effect 
  ?   ? 
Sample Size 1066 1066 1066 1180 1180 1180 
R-squared 0.18 0.21 0.38 0.15 0.24 0.34 
Note: The Table reports the first-stage coeﬃcients of the G2SLS RE regression (linear probability model), where
displacement status is the dependent variable. Reported are the coeﬃcients on Casualties (Proportion Missing/Killed) in
a number of specifications. The sample is restricted to Bosnian men (left panel) and women (right panel) aged 18-64.
Time trend and a constant are included in all specifications; Controls include: dummies for household status, dummies for
marital status, individual age-group dummies (four years by four years from 23 to 62, and one for 63-64), household
composition variables (number of dependent members aged 0, 1-5, 6-10, 11-15, and 16-17), dummies for educational
attainment (medium and high); Standard errors in brackets. ∗∗ significant at 1%, ∗ significant at 5%, † significant at 10%.
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Table 7: Results of the Falsification Test on the first-stage estimates.
Fist-stage estimates  
 
Men  
 
 
 
Women 
 
 
 
Dependent: non-conflict migration status  
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
(4) 
 
(5) 
 
(6) 
Instrument:       
Proportion Missing/Killed -0.099 -0.147 -0.000** -0.031 -0.310 -0.000**
 (0.548) (0.540) (0.000) (0.438) (0.450) (0.000) 
Controls 
 
 ? ?  ? ? 
Municipality 
Fixed-effect 
  ?   ? 
Sample Size 1066 1066 1066 1180 1180 1180 
R-squared 0.00 0.08 0.31 0.00 0.05 0.26 
Note: The Table reports the placebo first-stage coeﬃcients of the OLS regression of non-war migrant status on casualties
in the municipality of birth; non-war displacement is the dependent variable and non-migrants (stayers) are the control
group. Reported are the coeﬃcients on Casualties (Proportion Missing/Killed) in a number of specifications. The sample
is restricted to Bosnian men (left panel) and women (right panel) aged 18-64. See also Note to Table 9.
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Table 9: The eﬀect of displacement on men’s labour market outcomes.
Bosnian Men  GLS RE   G2SLS RE  
 
 
Dependent: 
(1) (2) (3) Sample 
Size 
(indiv.)
(4) (5) (6) Sample 
Size 
(indiv.)
Work -0.102** -0.125** -0.071* 4350 -0.304** -0.216** -0.149+ 4350 
 (0.033) (0.028) (0.030) (1183) (0.079) (0.065) (0.079) (1183)
Unemp 0.149** 0.154** 0.096** 4350 0.233** 0.229** 0.191** 4350 
 (0.027) (0.023) (0.025) (1183) (0.058) (0.051) (0.062) (1183)
Inactive -0.046+ -0.029 -0.027 4350 0.062 -0.016 -0.053 4350 
 (0.026) (0.020) (0.023) (1183) (0.063) (0.048) (0.060) (1183)
Ln(wage) 0.054 0.057 0.055 2366 -0.049 0.002 -0.171 2366 
 (0.052) (0.047) (0.048) (833) (0.128) (0.116) (0.137) (833) 
Hours (zeros -5.597** -1.438+ -0.897 4261 -13.409** -1.217 -2.491 4261 
included) (1.605) (0.778) (0.866) (1132) (3.799) (1.841) (2.259) (1132)
Hours (zeros -0.651 -1.263 -1.367 2425 3.299 1.102 -1.428 2425 
excluded) (1.362) (1.310) (1.344) (854) (3.028) (2.933) (3.481) (854) 
Controls 
 
 ? ? --  ? ? -- 
Municipality 
Fixed-effect 
  ? --   ? -- 
 
Note: The Table reports the GLS RE (left panel) and G2SLS RE (right panel) regression coeﬃcients on displacement.
The dependent variables are dummies for work, unemployment, inactivity, the natural log of the monthly wage and weekly
hours (with zeros included or not). The sample is restricted to Bosnian men aged 18-64. Time trend and a constant are
included in all specifications; Controls include: dummies for household status, dummies for marital status, individual
age-group dummies (four years by four years from 23 to 62, and one for 63-64), household composition variables (number
of dependent members aged 0, 1-5, 6-10, 11-15, and 16-17), dummies for educational attainment (medium and high);
Standard errors in brackets. ∗∗ significant at 1%, ∗ significant at 5%, † significant at 10%.
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Table 10: The eﬀect of displacement on women’s labour market outcomes.
Bosnian Women  GLS FE     G2SLS   
 
 
Dependent: 
(1) (2) (3) Sample 
Size 
(indiv.)
(4) (5) (6) Sample 
Size 
(indiv.)
Work -0.073** -0.059** -0.052* 4740 -0.147* -0.137* -0.152* 4740 
 (0.022) (0.021) (0.023) (1274) (0.064) (0.059) (0.068) (1274) 
Unemp 0.049* 0.037* 0.025 4740 0.044 0.044 -0.015 4740 
 (0.021) (0.019) (0.020) (1274) (0.053) (0.047) (0.054) (1274) 
Inactive 0.024 0.023 0.026 4740 0.109 0.110* 0.183** 4740 
 (0.027) (0.021) (0.023) (1274) (0.071) (0.056) (0.066) (1274) 
Ln(wage) -0.090 -0.048 -0.016 973 0.378 0.326 0.158 973 
 (0.077) (0.074) (0.075) (389) (0.281) (0.245) (0.226) (389) 
Hours (zeros -3.711** -0.465 -0.481 4673 -7.675** -0.475 -0.337 4673 
included) (0.924) (0.324) (0.363) (1241) (2.646) (0.892) (1.044) (1241) 
Hours (zeros -1.409 -1.798 -2.343 1074 4.396 -1.469 -9.793* 1074 
excluded) (1.608) (1.483) (1.468) (458) (5.045) (4.436) (4.581) (458) 
Controls 
 
 ? ? --  ? ? -- 
Municipality 
Fixed-effect 
  ? --   ? -- 
 
Note: The Table reports the GLS RE (left panel) and G2SLS RE (right panel) regression coeﬃcients on displacement.
The dependent variables are dummies for work, unemployment, inactivity, the natural log of the monthly wage and weekly
hours (with zeros included or not). The sample is restricted to Bosnian women aged 18-64. See also Note to Table 9.
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Table 13: The eﬀect of education on displaced men’s labour market outcomes.
   Bosnian men   
  Wo rk Unemployed Inac tive 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
GLS RE        
Displaced  -0.197** -0.090+ 0.227** 0.122** -0.027 -0.033 
  (0.050) (0.053) (0.044) (0.047) (0.040) (0.044) 
Med_High Ed  0.101** 0.137** -0.033+ -0.050* -0.069** -0.089** 
  (0.024) (0.024) (0.019) (0.020) (0.020) (0.021) 
Displaced *   0.107+ 0.029 -0.108* -0.039 -0.002 0.007 
Med_High Ed  (0.059) (0.059) (0.052) (0.051) (0.045) (0.046) 
Controls  ? ? ? ? ? ? 
Municipality 
Fixed-effects 
  ?  ?  ? 
 
IV-G2SLS RE 
       
Displaced  -0.192 -0.031 0.319** 0.215 -0.117 -0.179 
  (0.135) (0.173) (0.106) (0.135) (0.099) (0.130) 
Med_High Ed  0.129** 0.172** -0.032 -0.056* -0.094** -0.114** 
  (0.034) (0.036) (0.027) (0.028) (0.025) (0.027) 
Displaced *   -0.052 -0.161 -0.110 -0.018 0.146 0.160 
Med_High Ed  (0.152) (0.166) (0.120) (0.130) (0.112) (0.124) 
Controls  ? ? ? ? ? ? 
Municipality 
Fixed-effects 
  ?  ?  ? 
Observations  4350 4350 4350 4350 4350 4350 
Individuals  1183 1183 1183 1183 1183 1183 
Note: This table reports the eﬀects, for men, of displacement, education, and the additional eﬀect of education for the
displaced, on the following labour market outcomes: work, unemployment, and inactivity. The upper panel presents the
results from GLS RE regressions, and the lower from the G2SLS RE regressions, instrumenting for displacement. The
sample is restricted to Bosnian men aged 18-64. See also notes to Table 9.
41
Table 14: The eﬀect of education on displaced women’s labour market outcomes.
   Bosnian Women   
  Wo rk Unemployed Inac tive 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
GLS RE        
Displaced  -0.039 -0.030 0.040+ 0.021 -0.003 0.005 
  (0.024) (0.027) (0.022) (0.024) (0.027) (0.029) 
Med_High Ed  0.251** 0.235** 0.062** 0.045* -0.319** -0.286** 
  (0.024) (0.025) (0.019) (0.020) (0.021) (0.022) 
Displaced *   -0.064 -0.058 -0.001 0.013 0.072+ 0.051 
Med_High Ed  (0.045) (0.045) (0.038) (0.039) (0.042) (0.043) 
Controls  ? ? ? ? ? ? 
Municipality 
Fixed-effects 
  ?  ?  ? 
 
IV-G2SLS RE 
       
Displaced  -0.099 -0.124 0.051 0.006 0.062 0.131 
  (0.071) (0.086) (0.056) (0.069) (0.067) (0.083) 
Med_High Ed  0.260** 0.237** 0.071* 0.066* -0.337** -0.308** 
  (0.038) (0.041) (0.031) (0.033) (0.037) (0.040) 
Displaced *   -0.108 -0.068 -0.032 -0.066 0.151 0.138 
Med_High Ed  (0.125) (0.131) (0.103) (0.107) (0.120) (0.128) 
Controls  ? ? ? ? ? ? 
Municipality 
Fixed-effects 
  ?  ?  ? 
Observations  4740 4740 4740 4740 4740 4740 
Individuals  1274 1274 1274 1274 1274 1274 
Note: This table reports the eﬀects, for women, of displacement, education, and the additional eﬀect of education for the
displaced, on the following labour market outcomes: work, unemployment, and inactivity. The upper panel presents the
results of GLS RE regressions, and the lower, of G2SLS RE regressions, instrumenting for displacement. The sample is
restricted to Bosnian women aged 18-64. See also notes to Table 9.
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Table 15: The eﬀect of displacement on men’s labour market outcomes: robustness check on border
municipalities.
Bosnian Men  GLS RE   G2SLS RE  
 
 
Dependent: 
(1) (2) (3) Sample 
Size 
(indiv.)
(4) (5) (6) Sample 
Size 
(indiv.)
Work -0.063 -0.099** -0.072 2752 -0.352** -0.223* -0.206 2752 
 (0.047) (0.038) (0.044) (780) (0.129) (0.102) (0.134) (780) 
Unemp 0.118** 0.131** 0.123** 2752 0.214* 0.248** 0.357** 2752 
 (0.037) (0.032) (0.036) (780) (0.093) (0.082) (0.108) (780) 
Inactive -0.059+ -0.034 -0.051+ 2752 0.128 -0.022 -0.156 2752 
 (0.034) (0.025) (0.028) (780) (0.102) (0.073) (0.096) (780) 
Controls 
 
 ? ? --  ? ? -- 
Municipality 
Fixed-effect 
  ? --   ? -- 
 
Note: Robustness check — This table replicates the regression results reported in Table 9 when the sample is restricted to
Bosnian men aged 18-64 whose pre-war place of residence was not situation of the post-Dayton border between the RS
and the FBH. See also notes to Table 9.
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Table 16: The eﬀect of displacement on women’s labour market outcomes: robustness check on border
municipalities.
Bosnian Women  GLS RE   G2SLS RE  
 
 
Dependent: 
(1) (2) (3) Sample 
Size 
(indiv.)
(4) (5) (6) Sample 
Size 
(indiv.)
Work -0.062* -0.047+ -0.038 3086 -0.146+ -0.118 -0.159+ 3086 
 (0.029) (0.027) (0.030) (892) (0.081) (0.075) (0.087) (892) 
Unemp 0.045 0.028 0.008 3086 0.025 0.037 -0.016 3086 
 (0.028) (0.026) (0.027) (892) (0.068) (0.061) (0.069) (892) 
Inactive 0.015 0.020 0.032 3086 0.130 0.108 0.201* 3086 
 (0.035) (0.028) (0.031) (892) (0.090) (0.071) (0.084) (892) 
Controls 
 
 ? ? --  ? ? -- 
Municipality 
Fixed-effect 
  ? --   ? -- 
Note: Robustness check — This table replicates the regression results reported in Table 10 when the sample restricted to
Bosnian women aged 18-64 whose pre-war place of residence was not situation of the post-Dayton border between the RS
and the FBH. See also notes to Table 9.
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Table 17: The eﬀect of displacement on men’s labour market outcomes: robustness check on schooling
age in 1992.
Bosnian Men  GLS RE   G2SLS RE  
 
 
Dependent: 
(1) (2) (3) Sample 
Size 
(indiv.)
(4) (5) (6) Sample 
Size 
(indiv.)
Work -0.117** -0.134** -0.075* 3662 -0.324** -0.238** -0.157+ 3662 
 (0.036) (0.031) (0.034) (975) (0.085) (0.071) (0.085) (975) 
Unemp 0.142** 0.145** 0.094** 3662 0.230** 0.218** 0.181** 3662 
 (0.027) (0.025) (0.027) (975) (0.056) (0.053) (0.063) (975) 
Inactive -0.023 -0.010 -0.019 3662 0.084 0.015 -0.035 3662 
 (0.030) (0.022) (0.024) (975) (0.071) (0.052) (0.063) (975) 
Controls 
 
 ? ? --  ? ? -- 
Municipality 
Fixed-effect 
  ? --   ? -- 
Note: Robustness check — Sample restricted to Bosnian men aged 27 and above in 2001. See also notes to Table 9.
Table 18: The eﬀect of displacement on women’s labour market outcomes: robustness check on schooling
age in 1992.
Bosnian Women  GLS RE   G2SLS RE  
 
 
Dependent: 
(1) (2) (3) Sample 
Size 
(indiv.)
(4) (5) (6) Sample
Size 
(indiv.)
Work -0.072** -0.066** -0.050* 4098 -0.205** -0.204** -0.191** 4098 
 (0.025) (0.023) (0.025) (1093) (0.066) (0.061) (0.069) (1093)
Unemp 0.066** 0.051* 0.034 4098 0.077 0.080+ -0.004 4098 
 (0.022) (0.020) (0.022) (1093) (0.049) (0.047) (0.053) (1093)
Inactive 0.006 0.018 0.017 4098 0.133+ 0.137* 0.207** 4098 
 (0.030) (0.024) (0.025) (1093) (0.072) (0.058) (0.068) (1093)
Controls 
 
 ? ? --  ? ? -- 
Municipality 
Fixed-effect 
  ? --   ? -- 
 
Note: Robustness check — Sample restricted to Bosnian men aged 27 and above in 2001. See also notes to Table 9.
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Table 19: Sector of Occupation and Job Types by gender and displacement status.
  Stayer 
(Mean)
 Displaced 
(Mean) 
 t-stat of difference 
Men       
Sectors       
Primary  0.166 0.160 0.31 
Secondary  0.424 0.457 -1.19 
Tertiary  0.399 0.360 1.45 
Job Types     
Self-Employed  0.399 0.509 -4.04 
Paid Employee  0.590 0.483 3.90 
Help Family  0.009 0.005 0.81 
Sample Size  2222 381 -- 
Women     
Sectors     
Primary  0.140 0.158 -0.65 
Secondary  0.315 0.278 1.12 
Tertiary  0.535 0.556 -0.58 
Job Types     
Self-Employed  0.357 0.427 -2.01 
Paid Employee  0.610 0.535 2.10 
Help Family  0.032 0.037 -0.42 
Sample Size  910 241 -- 
Note: Descriptive statistics of the sectors of activity and job type for those currently in work — Sample restricted to
Bosnian men (upper panel) and women (lower panel) aged 18-64.
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